英国诺丁汉代写Essay:独立于意识

2018-12-05 16:05

所以出于所有的实际目的，我和洛克都认为这就是我们所需要建立的关于独立于意识的物体存在的高度确定性。这并不是说，他的逻辑并非没有一些批评的机会，比如敏感知识的概率确定性。然而，我认为洛克关于精神独立客体存在的推理的力量在于它的实用主义的简单性。如果我们认为某事物独立于我们的思想而存在，并且我们用我们的感官来证实这一点，那么它很可能确实独立于我们的思想而存在。如果我们认为我们所走的地面是坚实的，那么这个想法来自于我们在坚实的地面上行走的经验。运用洛克的推理，坚实的基础(作为独立于意识的客体)的观点可以被认为是确定的;在敏感知识允许的范围内。与洛克不同的是，我们可以像乔治·伯克利那样假设，物质(因而精神独立的物体)不存在。在他的探究中，怀疑主义表现在这样一个命题中，即我们只考虑理念，而不考虑实际的外部对象。例如，这种怀疑主义指责洛克的唯物主义，暗示它导致否认上帝(唐宁，2011)。伯克利拒绝洛克关于外部对象存在的唯物主义概念的这一方面，也是我拒绝伯克利的理想主义的一个关键因素。
英国诺丁汉代写Essay:独立于意识
So for all practical purposes, I contend along with Locke that this is all we need to establish a high level of certainty about the existence of mind-independent objects. This is not to say, that his logic is not without some openings for criticism such as the probabilistic certainty of sensitive knowledge.However I argue that the strength of Locke’s reasoning for the existence of mind independent objects lies in its pragmatic simplicity. If we have the idea that something exists independently of our mind and we confirm this with our senses, then it is highly probable that it does exist independently of our mind. If we have the idea that the ground we walk upon is solid, then the idea comes from our experience of solid ground through our walking upon it. Using Locke’s reasoning then, the idea of solid ground (as a mind independent object) can be held to be certain; to the limit that sensitive knowledge allows.In contrast to Locke, one can postulate as does George Berkeley, that material substances (and hence mind independent objects) do not exist. In his inquiry, scepticism surfaces amidst the proposition that we think only about the idea and not the actual external object. This scepticism charges the materialism of Locke for example, with implying that it leads to disavowing God (Downing, 2011). This aspect of Berkeley’s rejection of Locke’s materialist conceptions of the existence of external objects is also a key element of my rejection of Berkeley’s Idealism.